



# COMPARATIVE POLITICS

*Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*

CHARLES HAUSS



NINTH EDITION

# Comparative Politics

Domestic Responses to Global Challenges

Ninth Edition

Charles Hauss

Alliance for Peacebuilding



---

Australia • Brazil • Japan • Korea • Mexico • Singapore • Spain • United Kingdom • United States

This is an electronic version of the print textbook. Due to electronic rights restrictions, some third party content may be suppressed. Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. The publisher reserves the right to remove content from this title at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it. For valuable information on pricing, previous editions, changes to current editions, and alternate formats, please visit [www.cengage.com/highered](http://www.cengage.com/highered) to search by ISBN#, author, title, or keyword for materials in your areas of interest.



**Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges, 9th edition**

Charles Hauss

Product Director: Suzanne Jeans

Product Team Manager: Carolyn Merrill

Associate Product Manager: Scott Greenan

Content Developer: Michael B. Kopf,  
S4Carlisle Publishing Services

Content Coordinator: Eireann Aspell

Senior Media Developer: Laura Hildebrand

Marketing Director: Michelle Williams

Marketing Manager: Valerie Hartman

Market Development Manager:  
Courtney Wolstoncroft

Senior Content Project Manager: Joshua Allen

Senior Art Director: Linda May

Manufacturing Planner: Fola Orekoya

Senior Rights Acquisition Specialist:  
Jennifer Meyer Dare

Production Service: Cenveo® Publisher Services

Cover Designer: Chris Miller

Cover Image: Glowimages/Getty Images;  
Bartosz Hadyniak/the Agency Collection/  
Getty Images

Interior Credits: Comparative Emphasis:

© Ohmega1982/Shutterstock.com;

Profiles: Comstock Images/Getty Images

Compositor: Cenveo Publisher Services

© 2015, 2013, 2011 Cengage Learning

WCN: 02-200-203

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this work covered by the copyright herein may be reproduced, transmitted, stored, or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including but not limited to photocopying, recording, scanning, digitizing, taping, web distribution, information networks, or information storage and retrieval systems, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

For product information and technology assistance, contact us at

**Cengage Learning Customer & Sales Support, 1-800-354-9706**For permission to use material from this text or product,  
submit all requests online at [www.cengage.com/permissions](http://www.cengage.com/permissions).

Further permissions questions can be emailed to

**[permissionrequest@cengage.com](mailto:permissionrequest@cengage.com)**.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013946616

Student Edition:

ISBN-13: 978-1-285-46550-0

ISBN-10: 1-285-46550-4

**Cengage Learning**

200 First Stamford Place, 4th Floor

Stamford, CT 06902

USA

Cengage Learning is a leading provider of customized learning solutions with office locations around the globe, including Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico, Brazil and Japan. Locate your local office at **[international.cengage.com/region](http://international.cengage.com/region)**.

Cengage Learning products are represented in Canada by Nelson Education, Ltd.

For your course and learning solutions, visit **[www.cengage.com](http://www.cengage.com)**.Purchase any of our products at your local college store or at our preferred online store **[www.cengagebrain.com](http://www.cengagebrain.com)**.**Instructors:** Please visit **[login.cengage.com](http://login.cengage.com)** and log in to access instructor-specific resources.

Printed in the United States of America

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 17 16 15 14 13



# Brief Contents

<i>Chapter 1</i>	SEEING WITH NEW EYES	3
<i>Chapter 2</i>	THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES	27
<i>Chapter 3</i>	THE UNITED STATES	51
<i>Chapter 4</i>	THE UNITED KINGDOM	73
<i>Chapter 5</i>	FRANCE	107
<i>Chapter 6</i>	GERMANY	141
<i>Chapter 7</i>	THE EUROPEAN UNION	173
<i>Chapter 8</i>	CURRENT AND FORMER COMMUNIST REGIMES	199
<i>Chapter 9</i>	RUSSIA	221
<i>Chapter 10</i>	CHINA	257
<i>Chapter 11</i>	THE GLOBAL SOUTH	291
<i>Chapter 12</i>	INDIA	323
<i>Chapter 13</i>	IRAN	357
<i>Chapter 14</i>	NIGERIA	389
<i>Chapter 15</i>	MEXICO	423
<i>Chapter 16</i>	GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND DOMESTIC RESPONSES	459

# Contents

Preface	xi
Supplements for Students and Instructors	xiv
Acknowledgments	xv

## Part 1

### INTRODUCTION

---

#### Chapter 1

#### SEEING WITH NEW EYES 3

---

Five Big Questions	3
<i>Change Is the Only Constant in a 2.0 World?</i>	4
<i>Democratization?</i>	6
<i>Identity?</i>	6
<i>Human Security, Sustainability, and Resilience?</i>	7
<i>Globalization?</i>	8
Politics, Science, and Comparison	10
<i>Politics</i>	10
<i>Science</i>	10
<i>Comparison</i>	11
The Political System	12
<i>The Big Picture</i>	12
<i>The State</i>	12
<i>Feedback</i>	14
<i>The Environment</i>	14
<i>System Dynamics</i>	14
<i>Types of States</i>	15
Templates and the Structure of This Book	18
<i>Four Overlapping Issues</i>	18
<i>Global Challenges and Domestic Responses</i>	19
<i>The Political Iceberg</i>	19

<i>The Big Questions</i>	20
<i>Using This Book</i>	20
Over There Matters Over Here	21

## Part 2

### INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES

---

#### Chapter 2

#### THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES 27

---

Democracy and the Big Questions	27
Thinking About Democracy	28
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	28
<i>Rights</i>	28
<i>Competitive Elections</i>	29
<i>The Rule of Law</i>	29
<i>Capitalism and Affluence</i>	30
<i>Civil Society and Civic Culture</i>	30
Which Countries Are Democratic?	31
<i>Key Questions</i>	31
The Origins of the Democratic State	31
<i>The Evolution of Democratic Thought</i>	31
<i>Four Crises</i>	33
Political Culture	35
Political Participation	36
<i>Left and Right</i>	36
<i>Catch-All Parties</i>	37
<i>New Divisions</i>	38
<i>Interest Groups</i>	40
<i>Political Protest</i>	40

The Democratic State	41
<i>Presidential and Parliamentary Systems</i>	41
<i>The Rest of the State</i>	43
<i>The Democratic State: A Recap</i>	44
Public Policy	44
<i>The Interventionist State</i>	44
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	46
The Media	47
The Worst Form of Government Except for All the Others	47

### Chapter 3

## THE UNITED STATES 51

---

It's Even Worse than It Looks	51
Thinking About the United States	52
<i>Why a Chapter on the United States?</i>	52
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	53
<i>Key Questions</i>	53
The Evolution of the United States	54
<i>Creating the Constitutional Order</i>	54
<i>After the Framers</i>	55
<i>The Modern American State</i>	56
The American Political Culture	57
Political Participation	58
<i>A Two-Party System?</i>	58
<i>American Elections</i>	60
The Weak American State	64
<i>The Legislative Process</i>	64
<i>The Rest of the Weak State</i>	67
Public Policy	67
<i>Domestic Issues</i>	67
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	68
The Media	68
As a Frame of Reference	69

### Chapter 4

## THE UNITED KINGDOM 73

---

Pasty-Gate	73
Thinking about Great Britain	75
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	75
<i>Key Questions</i>	77

The Evolution of the British State	77
<i>The Broad Sweep of British History</i>	77
<i>The Collectivist Consensus</i>	80
<i>Thatcher, Blair, and Their Legacies</i>	81
British Political Culture	83
<i>The Civic Culture Survives—Sort Of</i>	83
Political Participation	85
<i>The Conservatives</i>	85
<i>Labour</i>	87
<i>The Liberal Democrats</i>	89
<i>Minor Parties</i>	91
<i>The British Electorate</i>	92
<i>Interest Groups</i>	93

The British State: Enduring Myths and Changing Realities	93
<i>The Monarchy and the Lords: Still Dignified?</i>	94
<i>Parliamentary Sovereignty—Sort Of</i>	95
<i>The Rest of the State</i>	98
<i>Constitutional Reform</i>	99
Public Policy: Foreign and Economic Policy	99
<i>The Thatcher and Blair (and Major and Brown) Revolutions</i>	99
<i>Cameron and the Coalition Government</i>	101
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	101
The Media	103
Conclusion: The Stakes in 2015	104

### Chapter 5

## FRANCE 107

---

President Hollande and the Future of the Left?	107
Thinking about France	108
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	108
<i>Key Questions</i>	110
The Evolution of the French State	110
<i>Transformations and Divisions</i>	110
<i>Traditional Republican Politics: A Vicious Circle</i>	111
<i>De Gaulle's Republic</i>	113
<i>Routinized Charisma: The Fifth Republic since de Gaulle</i>	114
Political Culture	115
<i>Taming Political Protest</i>	115
<i>New Divisions</i>	116



Political Participation 117  
    *Renewing the Party System* 117  
    *Why Change Happened: The French Electoral System* 121  
    *Parity: A Victory for Feminism?* 121  
    *Interest Groups* 122

The French State 123  
    *Toward a Presidential Republic* 123  
    *The Integrated Elite* 126  
    *The Rest of the State* 128

Public Policy: The Pursuit of Grandeur 129  
    *Economic Policy* 129  
    *The Politics of Headscarves* 132  
    *Foreign Policy* 133

The Media 137

Where Are the Big Questions? 137

## Chapter 6 GERMANY 141

---

Austerity and the Sovereign Debt Crisis 141

Thinking About Germany 143  
    *The Bottom Line* 143  
    *Key Questions* 144

The Evolution of the German State 145  
    *Unification and the Kaiser's Reich* 145  
    *Weimar and the Rise of Hitler* 146  
    *The Third Reich* 148  
    *Occupation and the Two Germanys* 149  
    *Building a Democratic Germany* 150  
    *Kohl and the New Germany* 150

Creating a Democratic Political Culture 151

Political Participation 154  
    *Parties and the Electoral Process* 154  
    *The Stakes of 2013* 159  
    *Interest Groups* 159

The German State: A Smoothly Functioning Democracy 160  
    *Chancellor Democracy* 160  
    *The Bundestag* 162  
    *The Bundesrat* 162  
    *Federalism* 163  
    *The Civil Service* 163

*The Federal Constitutional Court* 163  
*Corporatism* 164

Public Policy: *Modell Deutschland* 165  
    *The Social Market Economy* 165  
    *Unification* 166  
    *Europe* 169

The Media 169

Conclusion: The Big Questions 169

## Chapter 7 THE EUROPEAN UNION 173

---

Europe's Present/Europe's Future 173  
    *The Crisis* 173  
    *The Peace Prize* 175

Thinking About the European Union 176  
    *The Bottom Line* 176  
    *Key Questions* 177

The Evolution of the European Union 178  
    *Not Such a New Idea* 178  
    *Creating the Common Market* 180

Political Culture and Participation in the European Union 183

The European State? 184  
    *Toward a Constitution?* 184  
    *The Institutions* 185  
    *The European Union and National Sovereignty* 189  
    *The Complexity of European Union Decision Making* 190  
    *Next Steps?* 190

Public Policy in the European Union 190  
    *The Internal Market* 190

The Media 193

## Part 3 THE CRISIS OF COMMUNISM

---

### Chapter 8 CURRENT AND FORMER COMMUNIST REGIMES 199

---

Crisis? Which Crisis? 199

Thinking About Current and Former Communist Regimes 200

<i>The Bottom Line</i>	201
<i>Transitions</i>	202
<i>Raised Stakes/Big Questions</i>	203
<i>Key Questions</i>	203
Socialism, Marxism, and Leninism	203
<i>Socialism</i>	203
<i>Marxism</i>	204
<i>Marxism-Leninism</i>	206
<i>Stalinism</i>	206
<i>Expansion</i>	207
<i>De-Stalinization</i>	208
The Marxist-Leninist State	208
<i>The Party State</i>	208
<i>The Graying of Communism</i>	209
The Crisis of Communism: Suicide by Public Policy	210
<i>Reform: Too Little, Too Late</i>	210
<i>1989: The Year That Changed the World</i>	211
<i>The Remnants of the Communist World</i>	213
Transitions	213
<i>Economic Collapse</i>	213
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	215
<i>Hybrid Regimes</i>	215
<i>Domestic and International Causes</i>	216
The Media	216
Conclusion: The Big Questions	217

## Chapter 9 RUSSIA 221

---

Déjà Vu All Over Again?	221
Thinking About Russia	222
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	223
<i>Key Questions</i>	224
The Evolution of the Russian State	225
<i>The Broad Sweep of Russian History</i>	225
<i>Prelude to Revolution</i>	225
<i>Lenin and the (Wrong?) Revolution</i>	226
<i>Terror and the Modernization of the Soviet Union</i>	227
<i>Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and the Politics of Decline</i>	229
<i>The Collapse of the Soviet State: The Gorbachev Years</i>	231

<i>The Party State</i>	231
<i>Reform</i>	231
<i>Crisis and Collapse</i>	233
<i>Between Dictatorship and Democracy</i>	234
<i>Putin and Stability: At What Cost?</i>	237
Political Culture and Participation	238
<i>Political Culture</i>	238
<i>Political Parties and Elections</i>	239
<i>Civil Society</i>	243
The Russian State: The Vertical of Power	244
<i>The Presidency</i>	245
<i>The Oligarchs</i>	246
<i>The Parliament</i>	247
<i>The Bureaucracy</i>	248
<i>The Judiciary</i>	248
<i>The Federation</i>	249
<i>The Military</i>	249
Public Policy	249
<i>The Economy</i>	249
<i>Foreign Policy</i>	252
The Media	253
Conclusion: Half Empty or Half Full?	254

## Chapter 10 CHINA 257

---

A Smooth Transition?	257
Thinking About China	259
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	259
<i>Key Questions</i>	260
The Evolution of the Chinese State	260
<i>The Broad Sweep of Chinese History</i>	260
<i>A Failed Revolution</i>	261
<i>China Stands Up</i>	262
<i>Factionalism</i>	264
<i>Reform</i>	267
Political Culture	269
<i>A Blank Slate? A Cultural Revolution?</i>	269
<i>Cultural Politics since the Death of Mao Zedong</i>	270
Political Participation	272
<i>Top-Down Participation</i>	272
<i>And Bottom Up?</i>	272
<i>Predicting the Future?</i>	274

The Party State 275  
    *The CCP in Power* 275  
    *Fragmented Authoritarianism* 277  
    *The Future of the Party-State?* 278  
Public Policy: *Perestroika* without Glasnost 279  
    *Economic Reform* 279  
    *Foreign Policy* 282  
The Media 284  
Conclusion: Is Change the Only Constant? 285

## Part 4

# THE GLOBAL SOUTH

---

## Chapter 11 THE GLOBAL SOUTH 291

---

A Single Slum? 291  
Thinking about the Global South 293  
    *What's in a Name?* 293  
    *Lives Without Dignity* 294  
    *Political Dynamics* 300  
    *What Matters Over There Matters Over Here* 300  
    *Key Questions* 300  
The Evolution of Politics in the Global South 301  
    *Imperialism and Its Legacy* 301  
    *Independence* 302  
    *Postcolonial Problems* 302  
Political Culture 303  
Political Participation 304  
Weak and Failed States 306  
    *Democracies* 307  
    *Authoritarianism* 307  
    *Failed States* 308  
Public Policy: The Myths and Realities of Development 309  
    *Development* 309  
    *Democratization?* 318  
The Media 319

## Chapter 12 INDIA 323

---

A Tale of Two Neighborhoods 323  
Thinking About India 325

*The Bottom Line* 325  
*Key Questions* 327  
The Evolution of the Indian State 328  
    *The Mughals and the Impact of Islam* 328  
    *British Colonialism* 329  
    *The Struggle for Independence* 330  
    *The Nehru Years* 332  
    *Centralization and Fragmentation under Indira Gandhi* 333  
    *Coalition Politics* 335  
Political Culture 336  
    *Identity Politics* 336  
    *Regime Success* 337  
    *The Challenge of Modernization* 337  
Political Participation 338  
    *Congress* 338  
    *The Bharatiya Janata Party* 340  
    *The Other Parties* 342  
    *The Elections of 2004 and 2009* 342  
    *Interest Groups* 343  
The Indian State 344  
    *The Constitution* 344  
    *Parliament* 344  
    *The Bureaucracy* 345  
    *Federalism* 345  
Public Policy 346  
    *Confronting Communal Violence* 346  
    *Stimulating the Economy* 350  
The Media 353  
Conclusion: Democracy in India...and Beyond 354

## Chapter 13 IRAN 357

---

A Very Strange Election 357  
Thinking About Iran 358  
    *The Bottom Line* 358  
    *Key Concepts and Questions* 361  
The Evolution of the Iranian State 362  
    *Before Islam* 362  
    *Islamic Iran* 362  
    *The Pahlavis* 364  
    *The Islamic Republic* 367



The People and Politics	371
<i>The Green Movement</i>	371
<i>Political Culture</i>	373
<i>Elections and the Ayatollahs' Democracy</i>	374
<i>The Women's Movement</i>	376
<i>Below the Surface of Some Very Murky Political Waters</i>	378
The Iranian State	378
<i>The Unelected Institutions</i>	379
<i>The Elected Institutions and the Balance of Power</i>	380
Public Policy	382
<i>Toward the Next War?</i>	382
<i>The Economy</i>	384
The Media	386
Conclusion: Uncertainty	386

## Chapter 14 NIGERIA 389

---

Goodluck, Jonathan	389
Thinking About Nigeria	390
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	391
<i>Key Questions</i>	394
The Evolution of the Nigerian State	394
<i>Before the British</i>	394
<i>Colonial Rule</i>	395
<i>Independence</i>	397
<i>The First Republic</i>	399
<i>Military Rule I</i>	400
<i>The Second Republic</i>	402
<i>Military Rule II</i>	402
<i>Military Rule III</i>	403
<i>The Fourth Republic</i>	404
Political Culture	405
<i>The Ties That Don't Bind</i>	406
<i>Elite Culture</i>	408
Political Participation	409
<i>Political Parties</i>	409
<i>Elections Under the Fourth Republic</i>	410
<i>Nonelectoral Participation</i>	410
<i>Systems Theory, Inputs, and Vicious Cycles</i>	412

The Nigerian State	412
<i>The Branches of Government and the Personalization of Power</i>	413
<i>Federalism</i>	414
<i>Corruption</i>	414
<i>The Military</i>	415
Public Policy	415
<i>Democratization</i>	416
<i>Economic Development and Structural Adjustment</i>	417
The Media	419
Conclusion: The Imam and the Pastor	419

## Chapter 15 MEXICO 423

---

They're Baaaaaaaaack	423
Thinking About Mexico	425
<i>The Bottom Line</i>	425
<i>Big Brother Is Watching</i>	426
<i>Key Concepts and Questions</i>	427
The Evolution of Mexican Politics	427
<i>The Colonial Era</i>	427
<i>Independence</i>	428
<i>The Revolution</i>	429
<i>Institutionalizing the Revolution</i>	430
<i>Cárdenas and His Legacy</i>	430
<i>An Institutional Revolutionary Party</i>	431
<i>The End of the PRI(?)</i>	433
Political Culture in Mexico	433
<i>Cultural Norms</i>	433
<i>Subcultures</i>	434
Political Participation	435
<i>Democratic Rights, Sort Of</i>	435
<i>The PRI's Hold on Power</i>	435
<i>The Other Parties</i>	438
<i>Toward a Three Party System?</i>	440
<i>Civil Society</i>	441
The Mexican State	441
<i>Non-Reelection and Presidential Domination</i>	442
<i>The Cabinet, the Bureaucracy, and the Judiciary</i>	443
<i>Congress and the Legislative Process</i>	444
<i>Federalism</i>	445

*Corruption* 445  
*Since 2000: Democracy Interrupted* 445  
Public Policy 446  
*Debt and Development* 446  
*U.S.-Mexican Relations: Immigration and  
Drugs* 450  
The Media 454  
Conclusion: Democracy Interrupted and  
the Big Questions 454

## Part 6

# CONCLUSION

---

### Chapter 16

## GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND DOMESTIC RESPONSES 459

---

The Big Questions Revisited 460  
*Change Is the Only Constant* 460  
*Democratization* 461  
*Identity* 461

*Globalization* 462  
*Domestic Responses to Global Challenges?* 465  
Toward a New Paradigm? 465  
*Paradigms and Paradigm Shifts* 465  
*Einstein and His One Liners* 467  
Systems Theory Revisited 468  
*Two Perspectives* 468  
The End of Power? 471  
*A Networked World* 471  
*The Three M Revolutions* 472  
*Being in Charge Isn't What It Used to Be* 473  
New Politics: Three Examples 474  
*International Regimes: The EU* 474  
*Peacebuilding* 474  
*The Gendered Nature of Globalization* 475  
Student and Citizen 477  
  
Glossary 479  
Name Index 491  
Subject Index 495

# Preface

This is the ninth edition of *Comparative Politics: Domestic Responses to Global Challenges*, which means I have revised it eight times. Never has it changed more from one edition to the next.

The book changed because of two phenomena, only the second of which was new.

First, the world keeps changing. That has been the backdrop to the entire history of this book, the first edition of which was written in the days after the Soviet Union collapsed.

Second, the two professions I am part of have also been changing in constructive ways that sent me back to the intellectual drawing boards. That is new, especially for comparative politics, which, frankly, has been stuck in many of the same intellectual ruts for more than a quarter century. But, it was also true of peacebuilding, where my colleagues and I are exploring more complex and—in academic terms—more interdisciplinary models.

As a result, I decided it was time to put everything in this book up for grabs. I initially considered changing the way it was structured, the countries it covered, and even the way the chapters on individual countries were organized.

In the end, I kept the basic structure of the book, but changed almost everything else. I thought twice before keeping even a single sentence from earlier editions. Concretely, that has resulted in a book that combines many features from earlier editions with new insights and features.

## New to This Edition: Overarching Themes

---

To begin with, much of the book revolves around the “big questions” that are at the heart of political life in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. In the decades since my own student days in the 1960s and 1970s, comparativists did not spend much time on them. In recent

years, they have become harder and harder for anyone interested in the social sciences to ignore. That said, we do not agree on what they are. I find four of them particularly useful and will focus on them, especially in the second half of the book:

- The overall pace of change in all areas of life.
- The impact of “identity politics” everywhere.
- Democratization and our difficulties in achieving it.
- New threats to security and political problem solving that at least in part are a reflection of globalization.

We are fortunate that political scientists and other observers *have* been addressing aspects of these and other overarching issues facing both political science and the world as a whole. Of those, the two most important conceptual and empirical breakthroughs have come, again, in the kinds of countries and regimes covered in Parts 3 and 4.

- Political scientists who focus on democratization have drawn our attention to what they often call hybrid regimes that combine elements of democratic and authoritarian rule, with the emphasis far too often on the latter.
- Other comparativists have begun to revise conventional interpretations of political and economic development. This new generation of analysts views development in broader and more historical terms that concentrate on both how states were formed and how they struggle with demands to include new groups in the social, political, and economic elites.

While I am delighted that political scientists are asking more of the tough questions that got me interested in the field forty years ago, my thinking has been reshaped even more by developments in peacebuilding and related disciplines. There, I am lucky to be part of a team of academic and “real world” analysts who are pushing the boundaries of political analysis in three main ways.



- In my work as a peacebuilder, I have been drawn to analyses of the increasingly widespread use of cooperative problem-solving techniques in most aspects of life *other than national politics*.
- Everyone from corporate executives to environmental scientists now increasingly relies on systems analysis and the insights it provides, which this edition uses to explore how countries and their states have evolved over time and may well do so even faster in the years to come.
- Last but by no means least, comparative political science researchers have done less than colleagues in most other fields in exploring the implications of globalization and the entangled and interconnected set of social, political, economic, and other relationships it has brought in its wake.

## New to This Edition: Specific Changes

---

For good reason, American law requires textbook publishers to disclose specific changes an author makes in each new edition. This edition is so different from the first eight that this section could easily have been very long.

**Chapter 1—Seeing with New Eyes.** In addition to the four big questions, Chapter 1 presents systems theory in a deeper and more analytical way.

**Chapter 2—Industrialized Democracies.** This chapter has changed less than most. However, it does raise some new ideas about deepening or “thickening” our understanding of democracy.

**Chapter 3—The United States.** This chapter includes full coverage of the 2012 election and the emergence of the Tea Party and Occupy movements. It also uses that material to suggest that readers consider the possibility that the United States could and perhaps should consider profound changes to a system that, in the words of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, is “worse than it looks.”

**Chapter 4—The United Kingdom.** The UK has not had a national election since the eighth edition of *Comparative Politics* was published. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the continuing difficulties faced by the coalition government as it tries to dig the country out of its slump, while also suggesting the European Union could prove to be the most divisive issue in British politics in the next few years.

**Chapter 5—France.** The new material in this chapter not surprisingly focuses on François Hollande’s election as president in 2012 and the policy changes that have

followed in its wake. By considering the problems France faces economically, this chapter anticipates the next two in which European issues are on center stage.

**Chapter 6—Germany.** Like the UK, Germany has not had an election, although one will be held before this edition is published, which outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel and her CDU seem almost certain to win. The most important theme in German politics, however, is the crisis in the euro-zone, which only Germany has the resources to address. It also focuses on the ways in which German policy making has revolved around consensus building more than in any of the other countries covered in this book.

**Chapter 7—The European Union.** Because the EU and the uncertain future of the euro are both so important for all of the industrialized democracies, they have become increasingly the focus of this chapter. This chapter also anticipates some of the prospects for international regimes and other forms of cooperative problem solving that will be at the heart of Chapter 16.

**Chapter 8—Current and Former Communist Regimes.** This chapter begins for the first time with the question of whether or not textbooks like this one even need to have a section on states inspired by Marxist analysis. Because these countries still share a common historical bond that political scientists are actually stressing more and more in their research on “hybrid regimes,” this chapter has been retained. Like Chapter 2, it has not changed all that much other than to consider some new conceptual breakthroughs on transitional regimes and democratization.

**Chapter 9—Russia.** Not surprisingly, this chapter focuses on President Putin’s return to power and its implications for democratization and other potential liberalizing trends in Russia, all of which are in more jeopardy than they were when the eighth edition of *Comparative Politics* was published. The emphases of the chapter remain the same, but the authoritarian aspects of the regime get even more attention.

**Chapter 10—China.** This chapter also focuses on the leadership transition, in this case to a new team of leaders in China. It also draws more attention to the growing tensions between a society that is more open economically and a political system that remains almost as closed as ever.

**Chapter 11—The Global South.** Unlike Chapters 2 and 8 that begin Parts 2 and 3, Chapter 11 has changed dramatically largely because our analyses of the Global South continue to expand in two different ways. First, we have a better understanding of the historical roots of development, especially in dynamics that made societies more

inclusive. Second, political scientists and economists are paying more attention to the BRICS and other countries that have made unexpected developmental progress in the twenty years since the first edition of *Comparative Politics* was written.

**Chapter 12—India.** This chapter concentrates on India as a BRIC, beginning with a discussion of two neighborhoods—a slum on the outskirts of Mumbai and a toney enclave near the government offices in New Delhi. It updates information about economic as well as political changes and points toward the generational change that will almost certainly follow the next legislative election that will occur shortly after this book is published.

**Chapter 13—Iran.** Like Iranian politics as a whole, this chapter concentrates on two interconnected themes—the standoff with the international community on nuclear and other issues and the transitional period after Rouhani took office as president. Even more than in the eighth edition, this one concentrates on the longer-term potential for change unleashed in the Green Movement and beyond.

**Chapter 14—Nigeria.** This chapter begins with a play on the name of President Goodluck Jonathan who has not had much good luck. The chapter continues to stress the

overlapping problems of failed development and failing state whoever is in charge in Nigeria. Unlike earlier editions, however, this version includes more material from anthropologists and students of religion, especially to help explain the emergence of Boko Haram.

**Chapter 15—Mexico.** Here, too, the text focuses on a new administration and the return of the PRI to power. Although some analysts stress the fact that Mexico seems poised for an economic boom and might be a candidate for the “next generation” of BRICS, this chapter concentrates on the country’s continuing burden of problems both domestically and in its relationship with the United States. Even more than in previous editions, it draws the reader’s attention to the fact that political life in Mexico is increasingly shaped by decisions and trends originating in Washington and beyond.

**Chapter 16—Global Challenges and Domestic Responses.** I have changed this chapter completely. It returns to the four big questions and systems analysis but revisits them in ways that lay out important political choices readers of this book will face in the rest of their lives as citizens—even if they don’t ever take another course in comparative politics.

# Supplements for Students and Instructors

## Online PowerLecture with Cognero®

ISBN-10: 1285775023 | ISBN-13: 9781285775029

---

This PowerLecture is an all-in-one online multimedia resource for class preparation, presentation, and testing. Accessible through [Cengage.com/login](http://Cengage.com/login) with your faculty account, you will find the following available for download: book-specific Microsoft® PowerPoint® presentations; a Test Bank in both Microsoft® Word® and Cognero® formats; an Instructor Manual; Microsoft® PowerPoint® Image Slides; and a JPEG Image Library.

The Test Bank, offered in Microsoft® Word® and Cognero® formats, contains multiple-choice and essay questions for each chapter. Cognero® is a flexible, online system that allows you to author, edit, and manage test bank content for Hauss, *Comparative Politics*, 9th Edition. Create multiple test versions instantly and deliver through your LMS from your classroom, or wherever you may be, with no special installs or downloads required.

The Instructor's Manual contains the following for each chapter: an outline and summary; critical thinking questions; in-class activities; lecture launching suggestions; a list of key terms with definitions; and suggested readings and Web resources.

The Microsoft® PowerPoint® presentations are ready-to-use, visual outlines of each chapter. These presentations are easily customized for your lectures, offered along with chapter-specific Microsoft® PowerPoint® Image Slides and JPEG Image Libraries. Access your Online PowerLecture at [www.cengage.com/login](http://www.cengage.com/login).

## Free Companion Web Site

ISBN-10: 1285834852 | ISBN-13: 9781285834856

---

This free companion website for *Comparative Politics*, accessible through [cengagebrain.com](http://cengagebrain.com), allows access to

chapter-specific interactive learning tools including flashcards, quizzes, glossaries, and more. Instructors also have access to the instructor's manual, PowerPoint presentations, and a test bank.

## CourseReader 0-30: Comparative Politics

PAC ISBN: 9781111477608

IAC ISBN: 9781111477622

---

CourseReader: Comparative Politics allows you to create your reader, your way, in just minutes. This affordable, fully customizable online reader provides access to thousands of permissions-cleared readings, articles, primary sources, and audio and video selections from the regularly-updated Gale research library database. This easy-to-use solution allows you to search for and select just the material you want for your courses. Each selection opens with a descriptive introduction to provide context and concludes with critical-thinking and multiple-choice questions to reinforce key points.

CourseReader is loaded with convenient tools like highlighting, printing, note-taking, and downloadable PDFs and MP3 audio files for each reading. CourseReader is the perfect complement to any Political Science course. It can be bundled with your current textbook, sold alone, or integrated into your learning management system. CourseReader 0-30 allows access to up to 30 selections in the reader. Please contact your Cengage sales representative for details.

# Acknowledgments

No one who writes a book this long—let alone one that has been through nine editions—works wholly on his own. Over the years, I have amassed hundreds of intellectual and personal debts that fall into six main categories.

First are the three generations of comparativists I have shared my career with. The oldest include my own professors and other scholars from my youth who shaped my career. John Lewis, Roy Pierce, Chuck Tilly, and others helped make me who I am. Of the few who are still alive and professionally active, I owe a lot to Bob Putnam, Bill Gamson, and Ron Suny. Second are the people I have taught and written with over the years, including David Rayside, Ken Wedding, Lee Wilson, Philip Giddings, Guilain Denooux, Sharon Wolchick, Val Bunce, and, most of all, Melissa Haussman, who was co-author of the eighth edition and chose not to continue with the ninth. Third are the handful of students who have gone on to build their own careers in political science, starting with Melissa and also including Alan Carlson and Robin Bye, not to mention the thousands of others who had the common sense to find other careers.

Second are my colleagues in the peacebuilding field, especially those at the Alliance for Peacebuilding—Melanie Greenberg, Melanie Kawano-Chiu, Roxanne Knapp, Emily Malozzi, Bob Berg, Rob Ricigliano, Peter Woodrow, Joel Peters, Guy and Heidi Burgess, and more.

Third, much of what I am I owe to Oberlin College. Not only did I get turned on to comparative politics there when I took time off from organizing anti-war demonstrations, I made lasting friends among my teachers and my fellow students, many of whom remain close friends to this day. Most of the royalties I earn from *Comparative Politics* goes to endow the Oberlin Social Capital Fund that helps current and future students defray the cost of doing summer internships at organizations that promote social change.

Fourth, the Cengage team, as always, made the book possible and the less creative parts of finishing it tolerable. Carolyn Merrill and Josh Allen shepherded it through the

production process after nagging me to make the book better, shorter, and cheaper. Michael Kopf, Sandhya Gola, and Joanne Johnson put up with my sloppiness in turning the manuscript into a finished product. Most of all, I owe more than I will ever be able to repay to Clark Baxter who originally signed me to write *Comparative Politics* before moving on to (for him) more interesting subjects at Cengage and then went on to become one of my best friends and the father of one of my best interns. In addition to the folks at Cengage, I want to thank the colleagues who reviewed this and earlier editions. I am always amazed at how insightful and helpful those anonymous critiques are.

The Cengage team and I would like to thank the following reviewers for their perspectives and feedback. For this edition, we would like to thank Christopher Muste, University of Montana, and Mark Croatti, George Washington University.

The following reviewed earlier editions:

Alex Avila, Mesa Community College; Valentine Belfiglio, Texas Woman's University; Clifford Bob, Duquesne University; Huiyun Feng, Utah State University; James Hedtke, Cabrini College; Sarah Henderson, Oregon State University; Edward Kwon, Northern Kentucky University; Shannan Mattiace, Allegheny College; John Mercurio, San Diego State University; Kevin Navratil, Moraine Valley Community College; Amy Risley, Rhodes College; Anca Turcu, Iowa State University; Walt Vanderbush, Miami University; Phillip Warf, Mendocino College; Wendy Whitman Cobb, Santa Fe College; Bruce Wilson, University of Central Florida; Nozar Alaolmolki, Hiram College; Leslie Anderson, University of Florida; Yan Bai, Grand Rapids Community College; Steve D. Bollard, Western Kentucky; Alan D. Buckley, Santa Monica College; John M. Buckley, Orange Coast College; William E. Carroll, Sam Houston State University; Kristine K. Cline, Riverside Community College; Richard Deeng, Temple University; Jana Eaton, Unionville High School, Kennett Square, Pennsylvania; Larry Elowitz, Georgia College;

Stacey Epifane, Saint John's University; Edward Epstein, University of Utah; Leslie Fadiga-Stewart, Delta State University; Joshua B. Forrest, University of Vermont; E. Gene Frankland, Ball State University; Susan Giaimo, Marquette University; Kristina Gilbert, Riverside Community College; Michael Gold-Biss, St. Cloud State University; Kerstin Hamann, University of Central Florida; Phil Huxtable, University of Kansas; Donna Johnson, Pace University; Ersin Kalaycioglu, Sabanci University; Amal Kavar, Utah State University; Michael Kenney, University of Florida; Stuart Krusell, Bentley University; Frank P. La Veness, St. John's University; J. Edward Lee, Winthrop University; Paul Lenze, Washington State University; David A. Lynch, St. Mary's University of Minnesota; Clinton W. Maffett, University of Memphis; Margaret Martin, University of St. Thomas; Hazel M. McFerson, George Mason University; Marian A. L. Miller, University of Akron; Richard M. Mills, Fordham University; Andrei Muntean, Drexel University; David J. Myers, Pennsylvania State University; Jeffrey R. Orenstein, Kent State University; William J. Parente, Sr., University of Scranton; Colin Ramsay, Lemon Bay High School, Englewood, FL; Steven Roach, University of South Florida; Bradley Scharf, Seattle University; Richard Stahler-Sholk, Eastern Michigan University; Pak W. Tang, Chaffey College; Hubert Tworzecki, Emory University; and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Emory University.

Fifth, I have to give special thanks to Dick O'Neill. Dick and I have known each other since we were in nursery school. While I became a 1960s leftist activist, Dick spent thirty years in the U.S. Navy and retired to create the Highlands Group, a think tank to help the Pentagon think outside the clichéd box. Dick introduced me to working with the military as a peacebuilder. We have had so much fun working together that our next project is to write a book together that builds on the themes of Chapter 16 and that we hope to use to catalyze a movement of audacious

and creative thinkers who just might be able to end the paralytic nature of American politics.

Finally, I also have to thank my family—by no means as an afterthought. The first eight editions of this book were dedicated to my wife, Gretchen Sandles, and her daughter, Evonne Fei. Gretchen is a top-notch political scientist in her own right and has spent her career helping U.S. government analysts write briefings for policy makers that are rarely more than two pages long—yes, the length of this book makes her cringe. Evonne was in high school when I started writing this book. Now, she is a clinical psychologist who works with soldiers. She convinced me to change who the book was dedicated to when one of her patients mentioned seeing her name in the last edition....She and her husband, Igor Petrovski, keep me on my political toes.

This edition is dedicated to their son—my grandson—Kiril Petrovski—whose very gene pool shows why comparative politics is important. His mother is half Chinese-American. His father was born and raised in Macedonia, and Kiril will be merely bilingual until I teach him French. He is also going to be a child of his times. Before he was two, he was already better at using an iPad than I am. He skypes his Macedonian grandparents several times a week. But most of all, he demonstrates why “doing” comparative politics is important every day by reminding me of the words on the coffee cup his mother gave me twenty years ago that I still use to end the book. It shows a picture of a cat holding up the world. It has the caption, “Fragile, Handle with Care.”

## Contact Me

---

I enjoy hearing feedback from readers. You can reach me at:

chiphauus@gmail.com

# To Kiril Petovski

Grandson extraordinaire and living proof that comparative politics matters.





# Introduction

PART

1

CHAPTER 1  
Seeing with New Eyes



AP Photo/Naader Daoud



© Cengage Learning

## CHAPTER OUTLINE

Five Big Questions	3
Politics, Science, and Comparison	10
The Political System	12
Templates and the Structure of This Book	18
Over There Matters Over Here	21

*The voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new lands but in seeing with new eyes.*

MARCEL PROUST

# Seeing with New Eyes

Comparative politics is one of the most exciting and challenging parts of political science. Those of us who study comparative politics for a living find it exciting because it constantly exposes us to new countries, concepts, ideas, ideals, people, values, and choices. The very things that make comparative politics exciting also make it challenging. It is a field full of tough questions, which can't be answered in a single course or a single book. In fact, it isn't clear that many of the questions we will be raising can be answered at all, in part because they are so complicated and in part because we disagree about what should be done in response to them.

For that reason, this is also going to be an unusual textbook for an unusual course. I will cover the material one typically finds in a textbook: Concepts. Names. Places. Events.

However, if you are going to get as much as possible out of either the book or the course, you will have to stretch yourself. In addition to the nuts and bolts of our part of political science, *Comparative Politics* will lead you to think about the “big ticket” questions that have altered and raised the stakes of political life during the course of my lifetime, not to mention yours.

It is hard to single out any one thing you absolutely have to do in order to understand the material covered in this book. However, if my years of teaching and writing about comparative politics are any indication, the statement by Marcel Proust that begins this chapter is a good place to start.

Proust was a novelist who never heard of comparative politics. But he got one thing about it right. Comparative politics is not about visiting places you've never been before, as interesting and enlightening as that can be. Rather, if he is right, we learn the most about new places, people, ideas, and events by looking at them differently—by “seeing with new eyes.”

## Five Big Questions

Most people are drawn to comparative politics by tough questions with implications that resonate around the world, which makes them a good jumping-off point for a book like this one. Unfortunately, because political scientists disagree about almost everything, there is no definitive list of such questions. I have chosen to focus on five of them because they meet three criteria:

- They show how uncertain and changeable our world is.
- In recent years, political scientists and others have made significant strides in understanding each of them.
- Despite what we have learned, political leaders and average citizens alike are still far from finding definitive answers to any of them.

And they are all presented as questions, because that is exactly what they are. And, whatever list we could agree on, political scientists are a contentious enough lot that we would disagree profoundly about the answers to them.

## Change Is the Only Constant in a 2.0 World?

Nearly 3,000 years ago, the philosopher Heraclitus claimed that “change is the only constant.” We will never know if his statement made sense for the Greece he lived in, but it certainly does today.

To get a first glimpse at that, take a step back from political science and consider some broader historical themes about change in general. More than forty years ago, Alvin Toffler wrote *Future Shock*, which argued that change of all sorts was occurring at an ever-accelerating rate.<sup>1</sup> Between the start of the industrial revolution and the end of World War II, people invented more things than they had in all of history until that time. Between the mid-1940s and the time Toffler wrote in 1970, the number of inventions doubled again twice, and he accurately predicted that the number of inventions would continue to skyrocket.


In 1965, there were no PCs, no color televisions, and no push button telephones. Cell phones existed only on the original version of *Star Trek*. News spread at what now feels like a snail’s pace. Vietnam had just become the first war in which television viewers could see what had happened within 24 hours on the next evening’s nightly news. Today, breaking news reaches us all but instantaneously in a 24/7 news cycle.

Figure 1.1 is a simplified way of thinking about the pace of change as he saw it. By his calculations, we were then living in humanity’s 800th lifetime and are now in our 803rd. If Toffler was right, ours is a world of ever-accelerating change whose upward slope may actually be steeper than the figure suggests.

In at least one important way, Heraclitus and Toffler were both wrong. Political life is not all about change. In every chapter that follows, we will find ample evidence of continuity, including policies and institutions that have outlived their utility no matter what your point of view.

<sup>1</sup>Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Random House, 1970). As a sign of the times, Toffler did not list his wife as a coauthor even though she was. They changed that “omission” in their later books. Their conclusions have been echoed with an even longer historical time frame in Ian Morris, *Why the West Rules—For Now* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

FIGURE 1.1 New Innovations over Time



You can get a first glimpse of the staying power of the status quo in this extract from *The Economist*’s editorial “commemorating” the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982.

**In life, he stood for the status quo—as firmly as a man can stand when he is in fact moving slowly backward on a conveyor belt that is moving slowly forward beneath his feet.<sup>2</sup>**

We will return to Brezhnev and this surprisingly funny obituary in Chapter 8. For now, it is enough to note that *The Economist* only got one thing wrong. The conveyor belt was moving anything but slowly, which would turn the Communist Party’s resistance to change into political

### Another Look at Continuity and Resistance to Change

To see this point about the way continuity can often be a powerful yet destructive force, take that quotation from *The Economist* and substitute the name of any of today’s political leaders you are interested in for Brezhnev’s, and ask yourself if the statement is a fair description of that person as well.

suicide by the time the decade was out.

The change depicted in Figure 1.1 can only partially be described using quantitative indicators like the number of inventions. Political life around the world is changing *qualitatively* as well.

To see that, consider the case of Wael Ghonim. In 2010, he was a young and unknown Egyptian marketing executive at Google’s offices in Dubai. That year, forces loyal to

<sup>2</sup>“Brezhnev’s Legacy.” *The Economist*, November 13, 1982, 7.



AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo

Egyptian woman at a Silent Stand.

President Hosni Mubarak killed Khaled Said, whom they claimed had swallowed a fatal dose of marijuana while being taken into custody. Ghonim created the Facebook page, “We Are All Khaled Said” to protest the government’s blatantly illegal and unjust actions.<sup>3</sup>

Ghonim insisted that the page’s administrators remain anonymous to protect them from the secret police, who seemed willing to go to any length to protect Mubarak’s regime. Nonetheless, thousands of people flocked to the page. In late 2010, Ghonim took the movement beyond the Internet and organized a series of “silent stands” in which protesters gathered and said nothing in order to demonstrate their opposition to the Mubarak regime.

After the stands grew beyond his wildest expectations, Ghonim decided to organize even more assertive demonstrations. At that point, the authorities discovered that he ran the site and had him arrested. When he was released, the revolution he helped spark brought the regime to the brink of collapse. Fifteen days after their first demonstration, Mubarak became the second long-lasting Middle Eastern leader to resign. He would not be the last.

Ghonim and his Facebook friends did not act alone. Reformist movements seemed to appear out of nowhere.

<sup>3</sup>Wael Ghonim, *Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir*. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012). [www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPMU4rzE9i4](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPMU4rzE9i4). This video is in Arabic, but it doesn’t matter because video often doesn’t need words. The English titles, in fact, are often grammatically incorrect. It was made by a thirteen year old.

What came to be known as the **Arab Spring**<sup>4</sup> toppled entrenched authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, and (or so one hopes as I write), Syria.

The title Ghonim chose for the book about what he and his friends did may be as important as their accomplishments themselves: *Revolution 2.0*. As they saw it, their movement was different from anything that had come before it because it relied heavily on social media and was leaderless, with individual members organizing themselves and deciding what to do on their own.

Ghonim was not the first to call something “2.0.” Internet developers followed the lead of Tim O’Reilly, who started talking about Web 2.0 as early as 2004, the same year Facebook went live. They believed that social media were the start of something big that would soon allow us to share almost anything online and unleash tremendous creative potential in the process.

I was fortunate enough to attend one of the first conferences O’Reilly organized on Web 2.0 in which the people in the auditorium and countless others watching the event online sent Tweets that scrolled across a giant screen behind the speakers on the podium. I had a hard time seeing how my political friends and I could use the new media in our own work.

Then, the two Obama campaigns, the uprising by Iranian students in 2009, and Ghonim’s Facebook friends convinced me I was wrong. In fact, I suspect that the term I now like to use, “Everything 2.0,” just scratches the surface. Researchers in fields as different as organizational management and spirituality are exploring issues he either raises or alludes to, such

<sup>4</sup>Terms in bold are included in the lists of key terms at the end of each chapter and defined in the glossary at the end of the book.



as crowd sourcing, self-organizing phenomena, emerging patterns, and virtual organizations, as part of systems theory, which we will turn to later in this chapter.

Not everyone uses the 2.0 label to describe the profound social and economic changes they seek. That kind of terminology may have been a bit too trendy for the Tea Party and Occupy Movement activists in the United States.

In short, we know that change is under way. That is about all we can say with any certainty, however. In fact, the events changing our world are coming so quickly that pundits have a hard time even naming them, as the widespread use of labels such as “2.0,” “post-,” and “neo-” suggest.<sup>5</sup>

## Democratization?

Ghoniim and his fellow activists did not simply want to throw out the likes of Mubarak. They wanted to replace their hated **regimes** with **democracies**.

In Part 2, we will see that almost all of the longest-lasting and most firmly established democracies emerged as the unintended byproducts of other historical processes. Today, by contrast, conscious efforts to democratize other kinds of regimes are central features on the political agenda in just about all of them.

For activists like Ghoniim, democratization is a goal worth struggling and even dying for. However, as the aftermath of the Arab Spring has so tragically shown us, budding democracies all too often lapse back into **authoritarian** regimes—or worse.

There have been several so-called waves of **democratization** since the middle of the nineteenth century (see Table 1.1). The first covers the establishment of democratic regimes in parts of Europe and North America, the second covers its spread and solidification in more of Europe, and the third its continued expansion into the rest of Europe and the Global South, to the point that as many as two-thirds of the countries at least had competitive elections. The final one *may* be happening today with trends such as the Arab Spring and the **colored revolutions** that have arisen there, in Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia.

There is little doubt that **democracy** is popular. However, as we will see in Part 2, no country lives up to any version of the democratic ideal. And creating democratic regimes—whether by design or by historical accident—has always been difficult and given rise to intense conflict, including war. In Parts 3 and 4, we will see that political scientists have learned a good bit about how democratization has taken place so far. Unfortunately, policymakers have had a hard time turning that academic understanding into viable, practical public policy.

<sup>5</sup>I have a lot of books with 2.0 in the title. On the day I finished this chapter, Amazon sent *Capitalism 3.0* to my Kindle. The spectacular growth of Amazon, e-readers, and information technology (not to mention my first 3.0 book) reinforces the pace and uncertainty of the trends being discussed here.

**TABLE 1.1** Three (or Four?) Waves of Democratization

WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION	BEGINNING IN	KEY FEATURE
<b>First</b>	Nineteenth century	First democracies in Europe and North America
<b>Second</b>	1945	Creation of democracies in newly independent countries and solidification of older ones in Europe
<b>Third</b>	Mid-1970s	Spread to the Global South and Eastern Europe, accelerated by the End of the cold war
<b>Fourth (?)</b>	Twenty-first century	Arab Spring and “Colored Revolutions”

© Cengage Learning 2015

## Identity?

There are only a handful of countries that are homogeneous enough to avoid **identity politics**. In country after country, differences over race, religion, language, ethnicity, and region give rise to intractable conflicts that seem to defy solution ([www.beyondintractability.org](http://www.beyondintractability.org)).



## Comparative Emphasis: A Box about Boxes

Like any textbook published today, *Comparative Politics* has its share of boxes to help focus the reader’s attention. Most of them highlight a single theme in the text itself.

This one, however, is about boxes themselves—of the mental rather than the printed variety.

One of today’s most widely used clichés urges us to think “outside the box” and come up with creative new ideas. For good or ill, the opposite is likely to happen whenever a politician or pundit in Washington (where I live and work) uses the phrase.

*Comparative Politics* actually requires you to think both inside *and* outside the box. In my nonacademic work, I try to get people to think very far outside any conventional political “box.” To the degree that my colleagues and I succeed, it is largely because we also anchor our work in conventional political life, which can be a constraining box if there ever was one. ■

That is easiest to see quickly using religion as an example. Many of my European colleagues are perplexed by the political role religion plays in the rest of the world. Religion was once one of the most contentious issues there, touching off countless revolutions and civil wars. Today, religious practice in Europe is at an all-time low, and disputes about religious issues no longer divide people in politically significant ways.

In much of the rest of the world, religion remains as much of a political lightning rod as it ever has been.

That begins with the United States, where opposition to gay rights, a woman's freedom to choose, and even presidential candidate Mitt Romney's Mormon faith all have deep religious roots. Often, issues that do not seem to be primarily religious have faith-related overtones as in the "birther" claim that Barack Obama was not born in the United States and therefore is not eligible to hold the presidency.

Religious differences have far more devastating consequences along the tenth parallel to the north of the Equator, which the journalist Eliza Griswold calls the fault line between Christianity and Islam.<sup>6</sup> From Nigeria in the west to the Philippines in the east, disputes anchored in religion spill over into every other potentially disruptive issue and threaten to tear society apart.

In that sense, religion and other identity-based issues can be an analytical stepping-stone to help us understand political conflict in general. Researchers in a number of fields see religion as a key ingredient of people's identities and the way they answer such basic questions as "who am I?" Put simply, it is far easier to find common ground even on tough issues such as cutting budgets where the parties to a dispute can compromise by splitting the differences between them than it is when their very self-definition is at stake.

Because religious differences so often ignite irreconcilable conflicts, they keep us from seeing the more constructive role that religion can play in political life. At times, religious leaders have played a major role in bringing adversaries together to help resolve identity-based conflicts. Some are world famous, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the United States or Archbishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa. Other less well-known figures will be discussed in some of the chapters to come, such as Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammad Ashafa, who have been among the few people to have had any impact in stemming the violence between Christians and Muslims along the tenth parallel in northern Nigeria.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Eliza Griswold, *The Tenth Parallel* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).

<sup>7</sup>See [www.youtube.com/watch?v=xy1DfcyYX7c](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xy1DfcyYX7c).

## Human Security, Sustainability, and Resilience?

The changes discussed so far also cast doubt on many of the core assumptions about political life that date back at least to the creation of the modern nation-state more than three centuries ago. As we explore those assumptions, we will also journey the farthest from the traditional domains of academic political science, which, toward the end of this chapter and again in the conclusion to the book as a whole, I will argue we have to do.

Again, a single issue helps to get the discussion started—security. Until the end of the **cold war**, most international relations experts focused on national security, which they defined in terms of conventional definitions of power that include at least the threat of force. Today, the environment and other global issues have led more and more of us to focus on **human security**, which rests on the notion that we have to do more than just safeguard our vital geopolitical interests but meet basic social, economic, and environmental needs as well.

At first, it was mostly people in **nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)** like the one I work for who talked about human security. Now, such ideas are commonly discussed (although rarely by political scientists) in ways that help us glimpse what Everything 2.0 could be like.

Perhaps because my NGO works on peace building, I find an approach to human security written for the then Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff particularly compelling. In 2011, Admiral Michael Mullen asked Marine Colonel Mark Mykleby and Navy Captain Wayne Porter to draft a new approach to security for the post-cold war and post-9/11 world. In what is known as the Y Report, they wove together five themes that seemed surprising when I first saw them, especially given who the authors are.<sup>8</sup>

- National security requires global security. No country can be truly secure unless everyone else is. And "security" includes not just the geopolitics of traditional international relations but environmental, economic, and gender security as well.
- All systems are open and subject to constant change in ways that no state or any other actor can hope to control on its own.
- We need to adopt policies that build sustainability by stressing the ways that all pressing social problems overlap.

<sup>8</sup>Mark Mykleby and Wayne Porter, "A National Security Narrative" (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011). [www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf).

- Instead of traditional national defense, we have to work on all of the world's pressing problems and seek solutions for them in cooperation with people we might initially think of as adversaries.
- To use the jargon of conflict resolution, we have to try to find **positive-sum** or **win-win** solutions to our problems rather than the **zero-sum** or winner-take-all ones envisioned in traditional definitions of power and politics.

Human security also requires governments and other social organizations that are **resilient**, another concept to which political scientists are just beginning to pay attention. Resilience is based on many of the same assumptions Mykleby and Porter make: that systems are interconnected by way of tightly connected, complicated, and unpredictable feedback loops that constantly provide challenges, which are themselves tightly connected, complicated, and unpredictable.

As the subtitle of a recent book puts it, resilience can be thought of as the study of “why things bounce back,”<sup>9</sup> which leads to two more political questions, the first of which political scientists have long worried about. How do individuals and organizations respond after they have faced a major, traumatic challenge? As we will see, many countries have “bounced back” from adversity. We pose the second one far less often. How can politicians and citizens alike learn to anticipate crises and plan ways of reacting to them before they happen? If Mykleby and Porter and others like them are right, that may be the most important question to ask. It also is certainly the most difficult to answer.

## Globalization?

**Globalization** is one of the most important but least understood buzzwords in the social sciences today. Everyone “knows” that the world is shrinking. The word *knows* is in quotation marks in the preceding sentence because we all know that it literally is not true. My office and the room you are reading this book in are as far apart as they were when they were built. What we can say is that the distances and borders that separate us socially, economically, and environmentally don't matter as much as they did a few short decades ago.

Look around the room you are in now. Count all the countries the things in that room came from, including the labels inside your clothes. Without taking anything apart, I counted 27 on the day I wrote this chapter.

The exercise I just asked you to do is itself misleading because it masks even more complexity; many everyday objects are made up of parts that come from a number of places, no matter what their packaging says. My iPad, for example, was put together in China, not at Apple's world headquarters in Cupertino, California. It includes products manufactured in North America and East Asia by ten other companies with headquarters in three countries. The previous editions of this book were printed in Canada and Singapore. Cengage sells this book all over the world from offices in half a dozen countries.

If you believe the optimists, globalization could be one of the most positive features of modern life. More people are better off than ever before. We will see that most clearly in the **BRICS** (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries, where economic growth is occurring at such a fast and sustained rate that millions of people have been pulled out of poverty in the last couple of generations.

More pessimistic analysts, instead, focus instead on globalization's social and economic shortcomings. Somewhere around two billion people live on less than \$2 a day. As Katherine Boo shows in her riveting book on the slums of Mumbai (formerly Bombay), the residents of Annawadi do not have access to safe drinking water, electricity, adequate health care, indoor plumbing, and dozens of other things we in the West take for granted.<sup>10</sup>

Many analysts think of globalization primarily in economic terms. There is more international trade, movement of workers, and even international marriage than ever before.

There are signs, too, that something like a global culture is taking hold, especially among the young. Hip-hop, basketball, and MTV are becoming global phenomena. We are not becoming exactly the same. There may be McDonalds restaurants almost everywhere, but they do not all serve the same food ([foodnetworkhumor.com/2009/07/mcdonalds-menu-items-from-around-the-world-40-pics/](http://foodnetworkhumor.com/2009/07/mcdonalds-menu-items-from-around-the-world-40-pics/)). Nonetheless, the fact that the Golden Arches™ have become a global phenomenon tends to overshadow the differences in what the national franchises serve.

Similarly, migration is literally changing the face of almost every wealthy society. American, Canadian, and European cities are turning into cultural mosaics. People from a dozen countries live in my neighborhood. Within a mile or two of our house, we can eat at Mexican, Salvadoran, Peruvian, Turkish, Thai, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Indian, Korean, Greek, French, and Italian restaurants.

<sup>9</sup>Andrew Zoll and Ann Marie Healy, *Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2012).

<sup>10</sup>Katherine Boo, *Behind the Beautiful Forevers: Life, Death, and Hope in a Mumbai Undercity* (New York: Random House, 2012). [www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSK5Jrb6mXA](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSK5Jrb6mXA).

Globalization is also undoubtedly changing the college or university you attend. Your school may have opened campuses in other countries. At some schools, study abroad has become the norm; a few have even considered requiring it. Campuses themselves are changing. When I was a student at Oberlin College in the late 1960s, there were no more than a dozen foreign students. Today, they make up 10 percent of the student body. Grinnell College announced that it had 200 Chinese applicants with an 800 score on at least one SAT exam for its class of 2017.

Just as is the case with the economy, migration and other aspects of globalization are a mixed blessing politically. There is no better example of that than the terrorist attacks on 9/11. A small group of men had traveled halfway around the world to carry out the most devastating terrorist attacks the world had ever seen. By the end of that day, it was clear to most of us that our political world had changed forever because the world had shrunk in ways the cartoon on this page so brilliantly and tragically depicts. On September 10, vast oceans separated the continents from each other. By the next day, the *de facto* distance across the oceans had all but disappeared.

According to some observers, the attacks were, at least in part, an angry response to the global spread of Western culture. If so, today's terrorism may only be the tip of the clichéd political iceberg. As the world shrinks, the clash of contrasting cultures often gives rise to conflict albeit

rarely of the magnitude we saw in 2001. France, in particular, has seen massive demonstrations protesting policies that prohibit girls who wear the *hijab* and other religious clothing from attending school.

Globalization is also important for students of comparative politics because it shows us that we are less and less masters of our own destinies, however you choose to define the word “us.” National governments are losing the capacity to make and implement decisions on a host of issues that matter to their citizens.

Yet, when it comes to responding to global challenges, political leaders tend to look for national solutions first. The French parliament passed the law against wearing religious clothing and jewelry in the belief that it could integrate the Muslims who make up about 10 percent of the population by treating them exactly the same as everyone else. The American government tries to limit imports to “protect” endangered domestic jobs. The Chinese and Iranians are fighting what seems to be a losing battle to keep their citizens from having full access to the Internet.

The discussion so far leads us to this book's subtitle—domestic responses to global challenges—and draws our attention to the challenges facing political scientists as well as political leaders. We political scientists have long drawn a clear distinction between comparative politics and international relations. Comparativists focus on events *within* countries; international relations (IR) specialists concentrate on what happens *between* them.

